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IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION:
TECHNOLOGY AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Moshe Zviran
Tel Aviv University
zviran@tau.ac.il
Zippy Erlich
The Open University of Israel

ABSTRACT
Computer-based information systems in general, and Internet e-commerce and e-business
systems in particular, employ many types of resources that need to be protected against access
by unauthorized users. Three main components of access control are used in most information
systems: identification, authentication, and authorization. In this paper we focus on
authentication, which is the most problematic component. The three main approaches to user
authentication are: knowledge-based, possession-based, and biometric-based. We review and
compare the various authentication mechanisms of these approaches and the technology and
implementation issues they involve.
Our conclusion is that there is no silver bullet solution to user authentication problems.
Authentication practices need improvement.
Further research should lead to a better
understanding of user behavior and the applied psychology aspects of computer security.
Keywords: information systems security, identification, authentication, authorization, passwords,
question-and-answer passwords, primary passwords, secondary passwords, associative
passwords, cognitive passwords

I. INTRODUCTION
The use of the Internet and other information technologies is an integral part of business strategy.
With so many companies taking advantage of these technologies for their own information
systems, for business exchange, and for e-commerce, the security problems that their use entails
is an issue of primary concern if their potential is not to be limited. Information systems in general
and Internet information systems in particular need to ensure that only the intended users can
access their resources. The three main components of access control identification,
authentication, and authorization, are closely related. In security systems, however, they should
be operated apart. Failure to do so can lead to serious security problems [Auernheimer and Tasi,
2005].
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Identification – "Who are you?" – Users supply information to identify themselves, such as name,
username, and user ID. Supplying identification information does not prove that the user is who
he says he is.
Authentication – "Prove your identification" – The user verifies her identity. Some examples of
authentication mechanisms are user-selected passwords, system-generated passwords,
passphrases, question-and-answer passwords, tokens, and various biometrics characteristics.
For most systems, identification and authentication are the first line of defense to prevent
unauthorized users from entering the system.
Authorization – "What you are allowed to do" – The system determines what the identified and
authenticated user can actually access and what operations he is allowed to carry out.
Authorization is based on predefined criteria and user profiles.
These three components of access control can be found in almost all information systems. The
most problematic is the authentication component. The traditional and conventional approaches
for authorization and access control [Pernul, 1995], are not appropriate for addressing the
requirements of networked Internet or distributed information systems [Lopez et al., 2004]. Other
technologies and approaches need to be considered [Adams and Lloyd, 1999; Ashley and
Vandenwauver, 1999; Oppliger, 2002].
The traditional and by far most widely used form of authentication is the password. However, as
the number of systems used by individual users grows and the number of passwords required
increases, users tend to duplicate their passwords and cause the domino effect of password
reuse [Ives et al., 2004], namely, all the systems with the same password are no more secure
than the weakest system using this password.
In this paper we review and compare the three main approaches to authentication and their
methods, as well as technology and implementation issues concerning these methods.

II. AUTHENTICATION
Most computer systems are protected through a process of user identification and authentication
[Garfinkel and Spafford, 1996]. While identification is usually non-private information provided by
the user to identify herself and can be known by system administrators and other system users,
authentication provides secret, private information. The authentication methods can be divided
into three types [Menkus, 1988]:
• What the user knows (e.g. password, PIN (personal identification number), question-andanswer), referred to as knowledge-based authentication. It is based on private information
supplied by the user.
• What the user has (e.g. memory card and smart card tokens), referred to as possessionbased authentication. It is based on private objects that the user possesses.
• What the user is (e.g. fingerprint, iris scan, signature dynamics), referred to as biometricbased authentication. It is based on anatomical, physiological, or behavioral
characteristics.
Figure 1 describes identification and the three authentication types.
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Authentication
What the User Knows

•

Name

•

User ID

•

Username

•

E-mail address

•

...

•
•
•
•

Password
PIN
Passphrases
…

What the User Has
•
•
•
•
•

Smart token
Smart card
Credit card
Digital signature
…

What the User Is
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Fingerprint
Finger scan
Iris scan
Retina scan
Facial scan
Keyboard dynamics
Mouse dynamics
…

Figure 1. Identification and Authentication Types

While it may appear that any of these types can provide efficient authentication, each exhibits its
own benefits and drawbacks. Tradeoffs need to be made among security, ease of use, and ease
of administration.
The authentication types can be used alone or in combination. If one type is being used, it is
referred to as one-type or single-factor authentication; if two types are used, it is two-type or twofactor authentication; and if all three types are used, it is referred to as three-type or multi-factor
authentication. For the authentication process to be considered strong, it must be at least twotype.
KNOWLEDGE-BASED AUTHENTICATION
The most widely used type of authentication is knowledge-based authentication. Examples of
knowledge-based authentications are passwords, pass-phrases or pass-sentences [Spector and
Ginzberg, 1994], graphical passwords [Blonder, 1996; Davis et al., 2004; Thorpe and van
Oorschot, 2004; Wiedenbeck et al., 2005], pass-faces [Brostoff and Sasse, 2000] and PINs. The
traditional and by far most widely used form of authentication based on the user's knowledge is
the password [Cooper, 1989; Zviran and Haga, 1993].
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A password is conceptually simple for both system designers and end users. It consists of a
secret series of characters according some predefined rules. The user ID and password pair
serves for user identification and authentication to ensure that unauthorized users do not access
the system and to block unauthorized access to the computing resources. In most systems it can
provide effective protection if it is used correctly.
However, passwords are known to suffer from several pitfalls due to human information
processing limitations [Jobusch and Oldehoeft, 1989a, 1989b; Hitchings, 1995; Adams and
Sasse, 1999; Sasse et al., 2001; Carstens et al., 2004: Yan et al., 2004, 2005].
1. The tradeoff between memorizing and safety. Passwords should be difficult to guess and easy
to remember [Barton and Barton, 1984; Pfleeger, 1989]. Unfortunately, difficult to guess and
crack passwords are difficult to remember and easy to remember passwords are easy to guess
and crack. That poses a dilemma in the generation of passwords. The most secure password is
a random string of characters, such as qktPew3# [Porter, 1982; Wood, 1983; Barton and Barton,
1984; Garfinkel and Spafford, 1996]. Such passwords are difficult to guess by others, but are
difficult to remember. To remember them, users write them down [Paans and Herschberg, 1987],
which reduces their secrecy. Moreover, most users have multiple passwords for different systems
and applications, forcing them to remember several passwords [Adams and Sasse, 1999]. To
help them remember, they usually choose meaningful strings such as name, nickname, or initials
[Barton and Barton, 1984; Menkus, 1988; Riddle et al., 1989; Adams and Sasse, 1999], which are
easy to remember but also easy to crack.
2. Follow rules. To improve password security, the following rules are suggested for choosing and
maintaining passwords [Smith, 2002]:
• Non-dictionary and no-name passwords – a non-dictionary word prevents the use of
dictionary-based attacks. The only way to identify non-dictionary or no-name passwords is
by using brute force, which requires testing all the possible combinations of characters for
every length of password.
• Long enough passwords with mixed types of characters – passwords with at least eight
characters with upper and lower case letters, numbers and special symbols. Long
passwords with mixed types of characters increase the number of possible combinations
that need to be tested in the brute force method.
• Password aging and not reusing – periodic changing and not reusing passwords forces the
intruder to identify a new password each time. Thus, it is good practice to establish a
password aging policy that forces users to change passwords periodically, but not too
frequently, to avoid irritating users.
• Complex yet easy to remember passwords – passwords based on data structures that
users are accustomed to remembering, like creating acronyms from a personal sentence
known only to the user [Carstens et al., 2004; Yan et al., 2005], or the use of certain
elements such as rhymes that make the password more memorable. Yan et al. [2005]
observed that passwords based on mnemonic phrases are just as hard to crack as random
passwords yet are just as easy to remember as naïve user selections.
• Passwords should not be shared and should not be written – writing down or sharing
passwords harms their secrecy.
Passwords that follow these suggestions are more effective, more difficult to identify, and harder
to determine by cracking utilities. To improve their security, the strength of passwords should be
verified by the system administrators using password cracking programs like dictionary attack
programs and/or brute force attack programs. It is common practice for system administrators to
invoke reactive password checkers to identify weak passwords or to use proactive checkers to
filter out certain classes of weak passwords when the user inputs the password for the first time
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[Bishop and Klein, 1995]. Also, password files should be protected properly and the passwords
should be encrypted or hashed.
3. Human authentication. Some mechanisms ensure human authentication and protect against
automated programs used by attackers. An example of such a mechanism is the one used by
Microsoft Hotmail™, which introduces a picture with some character set and asks the user to
identify the character set in the picture, as shown in Figure 2. This mechanism is based on the
presumption that in most cases an automated program cannot recognize the characters in the
picture.
One way to overcome the problem of sniffing passwords when authentication is done over the
Internet is by one-time password which can be implemented using smart cards – a possessionbased authentication discussed below.

Figure 2. Microsoft Hotmail™ Check to Ensure Human Identification

TYPES OF PASSWORDS
Password types are categorized in several ways. One categorization is into primary and
secondary passwords, according to their level of authentication.
Primary and Secondary Passwords
Passwords that are used as the first level of authentication, allowing access to the information
system resources through the operating systems, are commonly referred to as primary
passwords [Ahituv et al., 1987; Pfleeger, 1989]. Passwords that are used as the second level of
authentication, for further control and protection of multilevel access to segments of these
resources, sensitive applications, or data files, are commonly referred to as secondary passwords
[Haga and Zviran, 1991; Zviran and Haga, 1993]. While the mechanisms employed in primary
passwords are determined by the operating system manufacturer, information systems designers
can select any password mechanism for secondary passwords.
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The format of primary passwords determined by the operating system manufacturer uses systemgenerated passwords or user-generated passwords with some predefined rules. With systemgenerated passwords, a password is automatically generated by the operating system and
assigned to a user. User-generated passwords are shown to be easier to remember but less
secure than system-generated passwords because they are easier to guess [Lopez et al., 2004].
Question-and-Answer Passwords
Question-and-answer passwords are also called secret questions or security questions. Used
mostly as a secondary password, they involve a dialogue between the user and the system
where the user responds to a set of brief questions about personal facts, opinions, and cues.
Thus, in Microsoft Hotmail™, when a user opens a new account, after entering the primary
password, she must also enter the question-and-answer password (the secret question), as
shown in Figure 3. This password is mainly used when the user forgets her primary password
and wants the system to help her to recall it.
Question-and-answer passwords were suggested as a method of overcoming the difficulty of
remembering passwords. In a typical question-and-answer session, a user is presented with
several randomly selected questions from a set of questions stored in his profile in the operating
system. Access to a system or a particular application is granted only upon a match between the
user's answers and those stored in the profile.
The two main methods of question-and-answer passwords are: cognitive passwords and
associative passwords, also called word association passwords [Smith, 1987; Haga and Zviran,
1991; Zviran and Haga, 1993; Bunnell et al., 1997; Pond et al., 2000].

Figure 3. Microsoft Hotmail™ Secondary Question-And-Answer Password
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Cognitive passwords. A cognitive password is something the user need not try to remember, he
just knows it. In cognitive passwords, the user provides the system with answers to personal
fact-based or opinion-based questions [Haga and Zviran, 1989], such as the user's mother's
maiden name (fact-based) or user's favorite type of music (opinion-based). Because cognitive
passwords were found to be easier to recall than conventional passwords and difficult to guess
when selected properly, they are recommended as a way to overcome the difficulty of composing
effective passwords [Zviran and Haga, 1990a, 1990b, 1993].
Bunnell et al. [1997] and Zviran and Haga [1990a, 1990b, 1993] found similar high recall rates for
fact-based and opinion-based cognitive items. They also found similar low guessing rates for
opinion-based cognitive items. However, Bunnell et al. [1997] found a guessing rate for factbased items to be much higher than that obtained by Zviran and Haga [1990a, 1993], which led
them to the conclusion that guessability for such items is too high unless items are carefully
selected. Podd et al. [1996] also found high recall rates for cognitive items similar to those
obtained by Zviran and Haga [1990a, 1990b, 1993]. They found unacceptably high guessing
rates for fact-based cognitive items and acceptable guessing and recall rates for the best of the
opinion-based items. Bunnell et al. [1997] found that fact-based cognitive items were better
recalled than opinion-based items.
Thus, carefully selected cognitive items can yield acceptable recall and guessing rates. In tandem
with a conventional password, they could improve security.
Associative passwords. In associative passwords, new users are asked to provide the system
with a set of word associations, consisting of both cues and their unique associated responses
[Smith, 1987]. To access the system, users must provide the correct associated responses to
rotating cues sampled from the set of cues that were provided to the system. Smith [1987]
argued for improved security with a secondary technique, like an associative password, rather
than increasing password complexity. Research, however, yielded inconsistent results about
recall and guessing associative passwords [Pond et al., 2000].
Pond et al. [2000] studied the effect of three different formulation techniques of associated
passwords on recall rates:
• Response only – respondents are provided with cue words and are required to generate an
associated response for each cue;
• Cues and responses – respondents generate both cues and associated responses;
• Theme – respondents generate both cue and response words having first decided upon a
theme for their word association.
No statistically significant differences in recall and guessing rates were found among the three
techniques, leading to the tentative conclusion that the effect of these formulation techniques on
ease of recall is small.
Associative passwords require more research to isolate the best method of generating them
[Bunnell et al., 1997; Pond et al., 2000].
Comparison of Knowledge-based Passwords
This subsection compares the findings of three studies of knowledge-based passwords.
In measuring the recall of self-generated passwords, system-generated passwords, passphrases,
cognitive passwords, and associative passwords, Zviran and Hega [1993] found that the recall
rate of associative passwords was more than double the recall rate for the other three. In
addition, cognitive passwords resulted in a slightly higher recall rate than associative passwords.
In comparing recall and guessing rates for conventional, cognitive, and associative passwords,
Podd et al. [1996] found that associative passwords produced low guessing rates but also low
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recall rates, whereas cognitive passwords produced the highest recall rates but also a high
guessing rate.
Recall and guessing rates for several types of knowledge-based passwords were studied by
Bunnell et al. [1997]. They examined:
• conventional passwords (including user self-generated and assigned system-generated)
• cognitive passwords (including fact-based and opinion-based), and
• associative passwords.
They found that conventional self-generated and assigned system-generated passwords resulted
in relatively high recall rates coupled with relatively low guessability rates. The guessability rates
for the fact-based and opinion-based cognitive items were high. The fact-based cognitive items
yielded the highest recall rates but their guessability rate was much too high. However, the best
fact-based and opinion-based items resulted in relatively low guessability and reasonably high
recall rates. On the other hand, associative items produced low guessability rates but also
relatively poor recall rates.
POSSESSION-BASED AUTHENTICATION
Authentication based on what the user has is referred to as possession-based or token-based
authentication. It makes use mainly of physical objects that a user possesses, like tokens.
However, presentation of a valid token does not prove ownership because it may have been
stolen or duplicated by sophisticated fraudulent means [Svigals, 1994]. Tokens also create
problems of administration and are inconvenient for users to carry around.
Types of Tokens
Tokens are usually divided into memory tokens and smart tokens.
Memory tokens. Memory tokens store information but do not process it. Special devices are
needed to write and read the data to and from the tokens. The most common type of memory
token is the magnetic card, which is used mostly for authentication together with a knowledgebased authentication mechanism such as the user's PIN. Memory tokens are inexpensive to
produce. Using them with PINs provides significantly more security than PINs or passwords
alone.
Smart tokens. Unlike memory tokens, smart tokens incorporate one or more embedded
integrated circuits which enable them to process information. Like memory tokens, most smart
tokens are used for authentication together with a knowledge-based authentication mechanism
such as the user's PIN. Of the various types of smart tokens, the most widely used are those that
house an integrated chip containing a microprocessor. The smart cards are used in the
identification and authentication processes, both in networked and stand-alone computer
systems. Their portability and cryptographic capacity led to their wide use in many e-commerce
applications [Juang, 2004]. When using smart cards for authentication, the card must first be
physically presented to the computer system. Then authentication of the card by the system is
performed, a process that usually involves execution of cryptological algorithms.
Authentication schemes proposed for enhancing the efficiency and security of smart cards
include:
1. Timestamp-based authentication schemes to prevent malicious replay attacks in networks
[Yang and Shieh, 1999; Chan and Cheng, 2000; Hwang and Li, 2000; Sun, 2000; Lee, Li and
Hwang, 2002; Lee, Hwang and Yang, 2002; Chan and Cheng, 2002; Fan et al., 2002; Wu and
Chieu, 2003; Jiang et al., 2004; Wu and Chen, 2004; Yang and Wang, 2004].
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2. Juang [2004] suggested an efficient password authenticated key agreement using smart cards.
The main merits of his scheme are:
• no password or verification table is required in the server;
• users can freely choose their own passwords;
• communication and computation costs are low;
• it requires mutual authentication (user-server); and
• it incorporates a key agreement mechanism by generating a session key agreed on by the
user and the server.
Due to their complexity, smart tokens are more expensive than memory tokens but they provide
greater flexibility and security and are more difficult to forge. Because of their high security level,
smart tokens are also used for one-time passwords for authentication across an open network.

BIOMETRIC-BASED AUTHENTICATION
We refer to authentication based on what the user is as biometric-based authentication; namely,
automatic identification using certain anatomical, behavioral, and physiological features and
characteristics associated with the user [Kim, 1995; Prabhakar et al., 2003].
Biometric authentications are based on physiological or behavioral characteristics that reliably
distinguish one person from another. Thus, it is possible to establish an identity based on who the
user is, rather than by what the user possesses or knows and remembers. Biometrics includes
both the collection and the comparison of these characteristics. A biometric system can be
viewed as a pattern recognition system consisting of three main modules:
• the sensor module,
• the feature extraction module, and
• the feature matching module.
The users' personal attributes are captured and stored in reference files to be compared for later
authentication to determine if a match exists. The biometric system is composed of biometric data
of the captured users' personal attributes necessary to perform user authentication and the
software and hardware required to collect, store, and process the biometric data.
Biometric authentications are technically complex and usually expensive because they require
special hardware. They are quite secure, but are not widely accepted by users because they are
perceived to be intrusive and an encroachment on personal privacy through automated means.
They also raise ethical issues [Alterman, 2003], such as potential misuse of the personal
biometrics for tracking and monitoring productivity [Deane et al., 1995]. Their main use is in
systems requiring a high level of security.
The emergence of biometrics addressed the problems that plague traditional verification
methods. They provide the most effective and accurate identification method because they
cannot easily be stolen or shared. Biometric systems also enhance user convenience by
alleviating the need to design and remember passwords. However, while convenient, the digital
scan or pattern is vulnerable to network analysis and once stolen, cannot be used any more [Ives
et al., 2004].
All biometric technologies inherently suffer from some level of false match or false non-match
[Matyas and Stapleton, 2000]. False match is a type II error –accepting a match when there is no
match. False non-match is a type I error –rejecting the match when there is a match. Biometric
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errors can occur for several reasons: the capture device might be dirty, the lighting might be poor,
and the system might not adjust well to different environmental factors such as sun, cold, or glare
[O'Gorman, 2003], and also due to the user's physiological changes because of surgery and
other conditions. Thresholds of acceptance for any of the biometric techniques depend on the
level of security required by the computer system. A high-security system, like a finance or health
system, will minimize the false match (type II error) rate at the expense of increasing the false
non-match (type I error) rate. A low-security system will minimize the false non-match rate at the
expense of increasing the false match rate.
Physiological and Behavioral Biometrics
Biometrics are usually divided into two main categories: physiological and behavioral biometrics.
Physiological biometrics
Physiological biometrics are based on the user's stable physical attributes. The best known are:
Fingerprint – a computerized version of the traditional fingerprint identification system, based on
the surface of curves formed by the ridges on a fingertip. It generates much information, which
requires a large amount of storage [Roddy and Stosz, 1997]. Biometric devices that read
fingerprints and plug into USB ports are widely available [Auernheimer and Tasi, 2005].
Finger scan – based on the extract of specific features from finger print data, they store and use
selective points on the fingerprint. Finger scan collects and uses a smaller amount of data than
fingerprint data.
Hand geometry – based on measures of the physical shape and dimensions of the hand. The
method uses a small camera.
Iris scan – based on the unique pattern, rings, and corona in the iris using a snapshot of the iris,
taken by a camera. It requires the camera to be properly placed so that the sun does not shine
into its aperture.
Retina scan – based on the pattern of the blood vessels on the backside of the eyeball. The iris
scan is more acceptable than the retina scan because it requires only a glance while the retina
scan blows air into the eye.
Facial scan – based on attributes of the face, bone structure, nose ridges, and eye width [Li and
Jain, 2005].
Fingerprints continue to be the most widely used physiological characteristic in systems that
automatically recognize a user's identity [Jones, 2000; Maltoni et al., 2003; Wayman et al., 2004;
Ratha and Bolle, 2005]. An example of one of its up to date applications is the use of fingerprintbased identification and authentication to support on-line, web-based course examinations
[Auernheimer and Tasi, 2005].
Behavioral biometrics
Behavioral biometrics are based on user behavioral attributes that are learned movements. The
best known are:
Keystroke or keyboard dynamics and signature dynamics – based on the different typing
dynamics, they try to capture the electrical signals for speed and movements while users are
typing or signing [Obaidat and Sadoun, 1997].
Mouse dynamics is similar to keyboard and signature dynamics in that users can be identified by
the way in which they use the mouse. This method was found to be less effective than keyboard
and signature dynamics [Guven and Sogukpinar, 2003].
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Speech or voice verification – based on the user’s voice pattern, when speaking into the
computer's microphone, it recognizes subtle differences in speech sounds and patterns. Speech
is usually categorized as behavioral because it is a product of learned behavior, although the
underlying body feature upon which speech is based is a vocal apparatus, which is physical and
relatively stable [O'Gorman, 2003].

III. COMPARING THE THREE AUTHENTICATION TYPES
The factors that need to be considered when choosing an authentication method are [Furnell et
al., 2000]:
• effectiveness,
• ease of implementation,
• ease of use, and
• user attitude and acceptance.
The knowledge-based authentication method is inexpensive and easy to implement and change.
Unfortunately it is also the easiest to compromise and is less secure than tokens or biometricauthentication methods, which are inherently more secure. On the other hand, tokens and
biometric-authentication methods are more expensive to implement. User’s prefer knowledgebased authentication and do not like biometric-based authentication.
Table 1 shows the ranking of the three authentication types according to the four factors.
Table1. Authentication Types and Their Ranking
Type of authentication

Effectiveness

Ease of

Ease of use

implement-

User
attitude

ation
Knowledge-based

Low

High

High

High

Possession-based

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

High

Low

Low

Low

Biometric-based

Because knowledge-based authentication is less effective than the other two types, it is
recommended that it be used as part of a two-type authentication. For example, authentication
can be based on a password and token or it can be based on a password and keystroke [Furnell
et al., 2004, Yu and Cho, 2004].

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
No silver bullet solution exists to user authentication problems. Computer systems are protected
by three main types of authentication methods: knowledge-based, possession-based, and
biometric-based. Each of these offers both benefits and drawbacks. Multiple layers of protection
provide substantially better security. When choosing an authentication method, the tradeoff
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among security effectiveness, ease of implementation, ease of use, and user attitude and
acceptance needs to be considered.
As long as passwords are comparatively inexpensive, simple to use, and attractive to users, they
will probably continue to be employed in low to medium security information systems for the
foreseeable future. When properly managed in a controlled environment, they can provide
effective security.
Further research is needed on the three authentication types to improve and enhance their
technologies and to enable the design of more usable and effective security systems.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Associate password: A question-and-answer password in which the user provides the system
with associated responses to rotating cues.
Authentication: Users verify their identity. The three main approaches to user authentication are
knowledge-based, possession-based, and biometric-based.
Authorization: The system determines what the identified and authenticated user can actually
access and what operations s/he is allowed to carry out. Authorization is based on predefined
criteria and user profiles.
Biometric-based authentication: Authentication based on what the user is, such as fingerprints
and signature dynamics. It is based on anatomical, physiological or behavioral characteristics.
Cognitive password: A question-and-answer password in which the user provides the system
with answers to personal fact-based questions such as the user’s mother’s maiden name, or
opinion-based questions such as the user’s favorite type of music.
Identification: Users supply information to identify themselves, such as name, username, and
user ID.
Knowledge-based authentication: Authentication based on what the user knows, such as
password, PIN, and question-and-answer. It is based on private information supplied by the user.
Password: Knowledge-based authentication consisting of a secret series of characters according
to some predefined rules. It is the most widely-used mechanism of authentication.
Possession-based authentication: Authentication based on what the user has, such as
memory cards and smart card tokens. Possession-based authentication is also referred to as
token-based authentication. It is based on private objects that the user possesses.
Primary password: Password that is used as the first level of authentication, allowing access to
the information system resources through the operating system.
Question-and-answer password: A session in which a user is presented with several randomly
selected questions from a set of questions stored in the user’s profile in the operating system.
The user’s answers are compared to those stored in the profile. Used mostly as a secondary
password. The two main types of question-and-answer passwords are cognitive passwords and
associative passwords.
Secondary password: Password that is used as the second level of authentication, for further
control and protection of multilevel access to segments of resources, sensitive applications, or
data files.
System-generated password: Password that is automatically generated by the operating
system and assigned to a user.
Token-based password: See possession based authentication.
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User-generated password: Password that is generated by the user according to some system
predefined rules.
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